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1.

C.

FORTE'"

INTRODUCTION

The tax consequences of corporate liquidations generally are
governed by sections 331 through 346 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 19541 (the Code). When one corporation desires to pur
chase another corporation's assets, certain provisions of these sec
tions come into play and serve an important role in the subsequent
purchase and sale. This article will analyze some of the problems
accompanying the use of liquidations in this setting. 2 Two recent
decisions, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commis
sioner 3 and R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner 4 form the founda
tion of this article and illustrate the problematic tax consequences
of corporate liquidations in the purchase and sale context. To ade
quately understand the import of these two cases, a brief descrip
tion of the development and operation of the law surrounding the
use of corporate liquidations in the purchase of assets is required.

* B.S. Southern Connecticut State College, 1975; J.D. Western New England
College School of Law, 1979; associate in the law firm of Silverstein & Winters, P.C.
New Haven, Ct. The author wishes to thank Professor Frederick D. Royal, Western
New England College School of Law, for his valuable assistance.
1. All section references, unless otherwise specified, are to the Internal Reve
nue Code of 1954, as amended [hereinafter referred to as I.R.C.J.
2. This article will analyze corporate liquidations as they relate to the results
sought by §§ 336 and 337. Section 336 will be discussed in light of its interaction
with § 334(b)(2).
3. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), affd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
909 (1979).
4. 69 T.C. 317 (1977), affd, 591 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1979). The Tax Court deci
sion was a supplemental opinion filed to resolve a dispute on a Rule 155 computa
tion. U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & P. 155. The original decision is reported at T.C.M.
(CCH) 97 (1977).
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A corporation 5 interested in purchasing another corporation's
assets may achieve its goal by one of several methods. The target
corporation 6 may adopt a plan of complete liquidation and distri
bute its assets in kind to its shareholders, who in turn will sell
those assets to the acquiring corporation. Alternatively, the target
may sell its assets directly to the purchaser, liquidate, and distrib
ute the proceeds to its shareholders. A third alternative is a direct
purchase by the acquiring corporation of the target's stock followed
by a subsequent liquidation of the newly acquired subsidiary. 7
While this article will describe the tax consequences surrounding
each of the above three alternatives, its central analysis will focus
upon a comparison of the latter two methods. Although purchase
and sale agreements involve many nontax considerations, reducing
the incidence of tax is certainly a primary objective of the parties.
The acquiring corporation is concerned with obtaining a basis in
the assets equal to the cost of the target corporation, while the
target corporation is concerned with maximizing the after-tax 8
liquidating distribution!) to its shareholders. Each of the three
methods yields the same economic result: the acquiring corporation
purchases the target corporation's assets; the target corporation's
shareholders receive the purchase price of the assets; and the tar
get corporation ceases to exist. Recognizing this fact, Congress and
the courts have sought to establish a uniform tax treatment regard
less of the method of transfer.
Prior to 19.54, however, the tax consequences of an asset pur
chase were heavily dependent on the form of the transaction. 10 A
direct sale of the assets by the corporate entity resulted in one tax
at the corporate level l l and a second tax to the shareholders upon
5. The purchasing corporation will hereinafter be referred to as the acquiring,
purchaser, parent, or P corporation, depending on the context in which the tenn is
used.
6. The target corporation hereinafter will be referred to as the seller, subsidi
ary, or S corporation, depending on the context in which the tenn is used.
7. Once the acquiring corporation has purchased all the stock of the target cor
poration, the target corporation becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquir
ing corporation.
8. The term "after-tax" in this context is somewhat misleading since the objec
tives of the target corporation are not to lessen the incidence of tax at the corporate
level but to eliminate it entirely.
9. The terms "liquidating distribution" or "liqUidating dividend" generally re
fer to amounts distributed in a partial or complete liquidation of a corporation. The
taxation of these amounts is generally governed by § 331.
10. See generally B. BITTKER & ]. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11 11.63 (4th ed. 1979).
11. I.R.C. of 1939, ch. 2, § 22{a), 53 Stat. 1 (now I.R.C. § 61).
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receipt of the proceeds in the subsequent liquidating distribu
tion. 12 The double taxation was avoided, though, if the liquidation
preceded the sale. 13 This was possible because corporations did not
recognize any gain or loss on the distribution of property
in partial or complete liquidation. 14 The pitfalls of such a system
were demonstrated by two well-known decisions, Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co.1 5 and United States v. Cumberland Public
Service CO.lS
In Court Holding Co., the corporation completed negotiations
for the sale of an apartment house, its sole asset. When the com
pany realized that the sale would result in the imposition of a tax at
the corporate level, consummation of the sale was postponed.1 7 At
tempting to avoid this tax, the corporation, pursuant to a complete
liquidation, transferred the bUilding to its shareholders, Minnie
Miller and her husband, who thereupon conveyed the property to
the buyer. 18
Unfortunately for the Millers, their last minute change did not
succeed. The form of the transaction was cast aside, and the gain
on the sale was attributed to the corporation. 19 Since "[t]he inci
dence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction . . .
[a] sale by one person cann~t be transformed for tax purposes in
to a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit . . . to pass
title. "20
Several years later the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Cumberland Public Service Co. to "clear up doubts
arising out of [its decision in] the Court Holding Co. case. "21 In
this situation, a group of shareholders succeeded where the Millers
had failed. To avoid paying capital gains tax, Cumberland Public

12. Id. § ll5(c) (now I.R.C. § 33J.(a», provides that amounts distributed in com
plete liquidation are treated as full payment in exchange for the stock.
13. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 332 n.3 (1945).
14. This exemption was not statutory until the enactment of § 336 in 1954. Sec
tion 336, however, merely codified prior judicial decisions and long-established
Treasury Regulations. See, e.g., Stock Yards Bank v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 964,
970 (1932); Houston Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 804 (1930); Treas. Reg. ll8,
§ 39.22(a)-20 (1939).
15. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
16. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
17. 324 U.S. at 333.
18.
19.
20.

[d.
[d. at 333-34.
[d. at 334..

21.

338 U.S. at 453.
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Service Co. rejected an offer to sell its assets, power transmission
and distribution equipment, to a local electric power cooperative.
At the same time, Cumberland's shareholders separately negotiated
with the cooperative and offered to acquire the desired assets and
sell them to the buyer. The offer was accepted. Cumberland Public
Service Co. distributed the equipment in a partial liquidation and
sold the remaining assets. The previously arranged sale occurred
shortly afterward. The Court found that, although the sllareholders'
motive was to remove the incidence of tax at the corporate level,
the liquidation was genuine and the sale was arranged by the
shareholders solely in their individual capacities. 22 Thus, under the
facts presented, the sale could not be attributed to the corporation.
The Court recognized the "oddities in tax consequences"23
arising from the controlling statutes but accepted the congressional
mandate contained therein. 24 Since "Congress . . . determined that
different tax consequences shall flow from different methods by which
. . . shareholders . . . may dispose of corporate property . . . [,]
[i]t is for the trial court, upon consideration of an entire transac
tion, to determine the factual category in which a particular trans
action belongs. "25
Although the real distinction between these two decisions, from
a practical standpoint, could mean little more than that the Cum
berland shareholders had received timely tax advice,26 the message
was clear: to receive favorable tax treatment, mold the transaction
to Cumberland. 27 With the tax consequences heavily dependent
upon the form of the transaction,28 the legacy of these decisions
was that the structure of the sale could constitute "a trap for the
unwary. "29
In 1954, Congress sought to eliminate this formalism by
creating a parity of tax treatment at the corporate level by enacting
section 337. 30 It generally provides that gain or loss realized sub
22. Id. at 453.
23. Id. at 455.
24. Id. at 456.
25. Id. For methods used to dispose of corporate property, examine those used
by the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland shareholders.
26. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11-69.
27. [d.
28. H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4896.
29. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11-69.
30. H.R. REP. No. 8300, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4896. The legislative history pertinent to § 337(a) does not
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sequent to the adoption of a plan for complete liquidation will not
be recognized by the selling corporation. 31 Additionally, the enact
ment of section 336 codified the long-established rule implemented
unsuccessflllly by the Millers in Court Holding Co. and success
fully by the Cumberland shareholders. It clearly provides that "no
gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution
of property in partial or complete liquidation. "32 Thus, under
the new provisions of the Code, the results in both Cumberland
and Court Holding Co. would be identical. "[W]hether the
corporation sells the assets and then distributes the proceeds in
complete liquidation, or distributes the assets in kind to the
shareholders for sale by them,"33 the incidence of tax at the corpo
rate level is effectively removed.
The acquiring corporation's search for parity of tax treatment
underwent a similar evolution. Its problems, which related to the
basis of the acquired assets, also were caused by the form of the
transaction. While a direct purchase of assets has always yielded
the normal cost basis,34 a stock purchase followed by a complete
liquidation of the subsidiary has not always produced the same re
sult. Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 the purchaser
received a carry-over basis, consisting of the seller's basis, in the
distributed assets.35 With this system the basis of the assets often
bore little or no relation to their fair market value36 or their cost
basis had they been purchased directly.
The system, therefore, fostered a disparity of basis treatment
between a direct asset purchase and a stock purchase, depending

specifically state that achieving parity at the corporate level was the section's under
lying purpose. In many cases, however, the belief is expressed that parity was the
goal of § 337. See Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 1l0, 114-15 (6th
Cir. 1973); Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 671-73 (1975). See also Central Tablet
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1974) (concise summary of the legis
lative history of § 337(a)). This section is commonly referred to as the "Anti-Court
Holding Co." provision. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.64, at 11-70.
31. l.R.C. § 337(c) delineates the limitations of this section.
32. ld. § 336 (emphasis added).
33. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 1l.63, at 11-69.
34. l.R.C. of 1939, ch. 2, § 113(a), 53 Stat. 1 (now l.R.C. § 1012).
35. ld. § 113(a)(15) (now l.R.C. § 334(b)(1)). For example, assume that the tar
get corporation owns assets with a fair market value of $100 and an adjusted basis of
$45. The acquiring corporation purchases the target's stock for $100, liquidates the
target, and receives the assets in the subsequent liquidating distribution. Its basis in
these assets is the target's basis of $45 and not the $100 cost to the acquiring corpo
ration.
36. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 1l.44, at 11-42.
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on the manner of acquisition. To eliminate this problem and to cre
ate parity for basis purposes between these two methods, courts
devised what became known as the Kimbell-Diamond principle, 37
now codified in section 334(b)(2)38 of the Code. In simple terms,
this section provides that the purchase price of the stock will be
come the parent corporation's basis in the assets. 39 In actuality, the
basis is subject to certain refinements 40 which maintain parity be
tween the two methods of acquisition and reflect the realities of
the transaction. 41 These refinements will be discussed at length in
part IV of this article.
Independent of each other, similar concepts of parity had
evolved for both buyers and sellers. Theoretically, the tax treat
ment of buyers as well as of sellers was identical regardless of the
method of acquisition. This article will focus on the tax treatment
of two purchase and sale techniques. The first method is one
where the parties agree that the acquiring corporation is to pur
chase the assets directly from the target corporation. Pursuant to
section 337(a), the shareholders of the seller need not be con
cerned with the problems that had confronted their predecessors in
COliri Holding Co. and Cumberland. The target may sell the as
sets, liquidate, and then distribute the proceeds to its shareholders
without taxation at the corporate level. Thus, the shareholders re
ceive the ilill benefits of the assets' value. On the opposite side of
the transaction, the acquiring corporation receives a cost basis in
the assets.
The second method occurs when the negotiations result in a
37. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), afI'd per
curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cat. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
38. Section 334(b)(2)(B) provides, inter alia, that:
[T]he basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the ad
justed basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made.
For purposes of the preceding s~ntence, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, proper adjustment in the adjusted basis of any stock shall be
made for any distribution made to the distributee with respect to such stock
before the adoption of the plan of liquidation, for any money received, for
any liabilities assumed or subject to which the property was received, and
for other items.
39. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4017, 4247. "In general, the consequences prescribed under sec
tion 334 reach results which permit the taxpayer to retain ... as the basis for the as
sets received in complete or partial liquidation, the adjusted basis for his stock thus
effectuating the principles of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner. ..."
ld.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4) (1955).
41. R.M. Smith, Inc. V. Commissioner, 69 T.C. at 335.
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purciJase of the outstanding stock of the target corporation, making
the target a wholly-owned subsidiary. In the sale of their stock, the
target's shareholders again receive the full benefit of the assets'
value without the dilution of taxes at the corporate level. This
illustrates the first concept of tax parity: that shareholders get the
full proceeds of assets without taxation at the corporate level. The
purchaser, however, possesses a wholly-owned subsidiary corpora
tion when all it desires is the subsidiary's assets. It therefore liqui
dates the subsidiary and, in return for its recently purchased stock,
receives the assets. Pursuant to section 336, there is no tax liability
to the subsidiary. Pursuant to section 332,42 the parent similarly
avoids the tax liability. The purchasing corporation's basis in the
newly acquired assets is determined pursuant to section 334(b)(2)
and theoretically equals the cost basis it would have received pur
suant to the first method described. Consequently, tax parity has
been provided to the purchaser as well.
Since they are part of the same tax system, the two concepts
of parity applicable to asset and stock purchases presumably are
designed to operate in harmony. This harmony, if it existed, would
be evidenced by the actual, not theoretical, elimination of tax con
siderations as they relate to both methods of acquisition. As the
holdings in Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commis
sioner43 and R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner44 will illustrate,
however, the two concepts of parity may not achieve this result.
This article will analyze the effect that Tennessee-Carolina, dealing
with the parity established by sections 336 and 337 in the context
of the tax benefit rule,45 and Smith, dealing with the fundamentals
of section 334(b)(2), had upon the second method of acquisition,
the stock purchase, described above. 46 The effect of these two
42. Section 332(a} provides that "No gain or loss shall be recognized on the re
ceipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another cor
poration."
43. 65 T.C. at 440.
44. 69 T.C. at 317.
45. The tax benefit rule is judicial in origin. It provides that if an amount previ
ously deducted from income is recovered, the amount recovered is includable in in
come. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
If, however, no tax benefit resulted from the previous deduction when it was taken,
the amount recovered is excluded. ld. at 401-02. In Alice Phelan, the plaintiff corpo
ration had donated two parcels of realty and had claimed a charitable deduction.
Seventeen years later, the donee reconveyed the property to the donor. The court
held that the "recovery" of the property produced taxable income in the year it was
recovered, to the extent of the previous charitable deduction. Id. at 399.
46. It should be noted that the concept of parity, as treated in this article, is not
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cases upon that method will in tum be compared with the results
of a direct asset purchase in order to determine whether parity of
tax treatment exists.
II.

TENNESSEE-CAROLINA AND THE TAX BENEFIT RULE

In January 1967, Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. 47
(Tennessee) purchased all the capital stock of Service Lines, Inc. 48
(Service Lines). Two months later, pursuant to sections 332 and
336, Service Lines declared a liquidating distribution and merged
into its parent corporation. 49 The assets distributed to Tennessee
included tires and tubes partly consumed but fully expensed,50 that
is, fully deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense,
by Service Lines. Pursuant to section 334(b)(2) Tennessee claimed
a stepped-up basis in the tires and tubes. 51 This amount was de
rived by allocating the purchase price of the stock proportionately
to each asset, based on its respective fair market value. 52
Tennessee, the purchaser, and Service Lines, the seller, subse
quently filed a consolidated retum 53 in which Tennessee expensed
limited to parity of tax treatment at the corporate level. Rather, the term "parity" en
visions identical tax treatment for all parties involved in the transaction. A short ex
ample will illustrate that the original enactment of § 337(a) resulted in parity not
only at the corporate level but at all levels, providing equal tax treatment for all par
ties involved. In analyzing the current validity of the tax benefit rule, the tax effect
to all parties likewise must be examined. Assume seller corporation (S) has assets
with a fair market value of $100,000. If purchasing corporation (P) buys these assets
directly, the following tax treatment will occur. Pursuant to § 337(a) there is no tax to
P and the full $100,000 is distributed to the shareholders of P who pay tax at capital
gains rates. P then has assets with a cost basis of $100,000. Now suppose that instead
of purchasing the assets directly, P purchases all the stock from the shareholders of
S. The purchase price of the stock will be the same $100,000 on which the share
holders of S will pay tax at the capital gains rates. Upon liquidation, S pays no tax
and P, which receives the assets in the liquidating distribution, assigns them a basis
of $100,000. See I.R.C. §§ 334(b)(2), 336. Thus, prior to the enactment of the recap
ture provisions and prior to the use of the tax benefit rule, tax treatment to all parties
was identical.
47. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. at 440.
48. Id. at 441.

49. [d.
50. "Expensed" is a term of art referring to deductions for "ordinary and neces
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business...." I.R.C. § 162(a).
51. Since the tires and tubes were fully expensed, their basis was zero. There
fore, upon allocating a portion of the stock purchase price to these assets, their basis
was stepped-up from zero to cost. Prior to the enactment of § 334(b)(2), the zero
basis would have been carried over. 582 F.2d at 380.

52. Id.
53.

See I.R.C. § 1501.
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the allocated amount, that is, its basis in the tires and tubes, as an
ordinary and necessary business expense. 54
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and held that
the tax benefit rule required Service Lines to include as income
the value of the previously expensed tires and tubes. 55 On appeal,
Tennessee argued that the tax benefit rule applies only when there
is an economic recovery of a previously deducted amount. Here,
Tennessee asserted that there had been no economic recovery by
Service Lines. The assets were distributed within the meaning of
section 336, and Service Lines received only worthless stock in ex
change. 56 In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit rejected this reasoning and upheld the Tax
Court. The Sixth Circuit noted that previous decisions clearly had
established that the tax benefit rule vitiated the nonrecognition
provisions of section 337(a).57 Recall that section 337(a) provides
that gain or loss realized subsequent to the adoption of a plan for
complete liquidation will not be recognized by the selling corpora
tion. 58 Tax benefit recovery, therefore, would be recognized under
section 337(a). Since section 337(a) was enacted to foster a parity of
tax treatment at the corporate level and to eliminate the formalistic
distinctions created by Court Holding Co. and Cumberland,59 the
majority reasoned that a failure to implement the tax benefit rule
under section 336 would create an "unnecessary disparity" between
the two statutes. 60 Consequently, the court required Service Lines
to include the amount expensed and later recovered as income.
Both courts declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in
C.l.R. v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 61 the only prior decision on this
54. 582 F.2d at 380.
55. 65 T.C. at 448. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
56. 582 F.2d at 380. The assets of the corporation had been distributed; thus,
there was no longer anything of value to support the value of the stock.
57. See cases discussed in O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and
the Overriding Principle of the Tax' Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215, 222-33 (1972).
58. 582 F.2d at 381 n.9; see I.R.c. § 337(a).
59. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
60. Although this seemed to be the policy underlying the majority's rationale,
the requirement of a recovery was needed to trigger the application of the tax benefit
rule. The court held that no actual physical recovery was necessary, and further, that
the event of liquidation caused Service Lines to undergo a "fictional" recovery. 582
F.2d at 382-83. See also Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33; Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2
C.B.106.
61. 324 F.2d 837 (9th CiT. 1963), affg, 36 TC. 1027 (1961). The basic dispute
in South Lake Farms stemmed from deductions that the acquired corporation had
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point. In South Lake Fanns, the court relied upon a literal inter
pretation of section 336. It detennined that under section 336,
which for purposes of this article addresses itself to a stock pur
chase transaction, the corporation received nothing;' stock, not as
sets, was sold, and the shareholders received the money.62 The
gain recognized by the shareholders could not be attributed to the
corporation. Simply pllt, since nothing was received, there was no
recovery of a previously deducted amount. The tax benefit rule
therefore was inapplicable. The court fully realized that its result
accorded a windfall to the previous shareholders. "They got a price
for their stock that was enhanced by their corporation's expendi
tures' which were deducted from its income, . . . even though it
never got the income that the expenditures were expected to pro
duce. "63 Nonetheless, since the language of section 336 clearly
stated that no gain or loss is recognized by the corporation, any
forthcoming remedy lay with Congress, not the courts. 64
In Tennessee-Carolina, the court's reluctance to follow South
Lake Fanns may have been due in part to its heightened
awareness of the potential disparity resulting from application of
the tax benefit rule to section 337 and not to section 336. The series
of decisions holding that section 337 liquidations must yield to the
tax benefit rule 65 all were decided subsequent to South Lake Fanns.
In any event, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits now are divided over
the issue of whether the tax benefit rule overrides the nonrecog
nition provisions of section 336. Most authorities66 seem to agree
taken for the planting and preparation of barley and cotton crops. These crops in
creased the fair market value of the acquired corporation's stock. The stockholders of
the acquired corporation sold out to South Lake Farms, Inc. Pursuant to § 334(b)(2),
the latter allocated the basis of its stock to the assets, including the cotton and barley
crops. It subsequently expensed the adjusted basis of these assets. Id. at 841-42
(Carter, J., dissenting).
No income was recognized by the seller and the purchaser's deductions were al
lowed. Therefore, a double deduction on the same items was allowed and the stock
holders of the acquired corporation, by virtue of the sale of stock and not assets,
avoided a tax at the corporate level and received a windfall. The Internal Revenue
Service [hereinafter referred to as IRS] did not agree with the majority's rationale.
Rev. Rul. 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106.
62. 324 F.2d at 839.
63. Id. at 840.
64.

[d.

65. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
66. See Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment Under Sec
tions 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 57,113-14 (1976); O'Hare, Application
of Tax Benefit Rule ill New Case Threatens Certain Liquidations, 44 J. TAX: 200
(1976). See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.65, at 11-84.
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that regardless of whether a true "recovery" exists, the failure to
apply the tax benefit rule to section 336 would foster a disparity
supposedly put to rest by the Eighty-third Congress. 67 Before one
may assess the true impact of Tennessee-Carolina's holding, how
ever, the post-Smith status of section 334(b)(2) must be scrutinized.

III. R.M. SMITH, INC. AND SECTION 334(b)(2)
Smith presented the Tax Court with an opportunity to closely
examine the basis refinements of section 334(b)(2) and their appli
cation. 68 The purchaser, R. M. Smith, Inc., acquired all the stock
of the seller, Gilmour Co. The seller owned certain assets subject
to recapture liability upon liquidation. Recapture can be conceptual
ized as another variation of the tax benefit rule. Depreciation deduc
tions taken against ordinary income are based upon an estimation of
the depreciable asset's useful life and salvage value. At the end
of the asset's useful life its adjusted basis, its original basis minus
the deductions for depreciation, ideally is equal to its fair market
value. In instances where the value exceeds the basis it becomes
apparent that excessive deductions have been taken. If the asset
is sold, the difference between the adjusted basis and the amount
received is taxed as ordinary income even though the property may
be a capital asset and otherwise subject to favorable capital gains
treatment. In selling the asset the owner has recaptured the
excessive depreciation deductions previously credited against ordi
nary income, therefore the amount recaptured is subject to taxa
tion at ordinary income rates. 69
In Smith the "existence of these liabilities was recognized by
. . . [R.M. Smith, Inc.] and . . . the agreed-upon stock purchase
price took these liabilities into account. "70 Accordingly, the pur

67. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1973);
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] 3 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 4017, 4244.
68. 69 T.C. at 317. One author has stated that despite the considerable number
of transactions involving § 334(b)(2), there is scant authority in the area. Smith is
one of the few cases dealing with "how (rather than whether) § 334(b)(2) is to ap
ply." Silverman, Leave it to Smith (or, "Refinements" on Section 334(bX2)), 33 TAX.
L. REV. 545, 546 (1978).
Smith relied heavily on another of these "few" cases, First Nat'l State Bank v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C. 419 (1968), for guidance in determining "refinements" for
earnings and profits pursuant to § 334(b)(2). Refinements will be discussed in de
tail in the text accompanying notes 96-127 infra.
69. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250.
70. 69 T.C. at 322.
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chase price was adjusted downward to account for the tax liability as
sumed by Smith, the buyer. 71 Upon liquidation by Smith, the
court determined the fair market value of the assets to be equal to
the purchase price of the stock, plus taxes and other miscellaneous
liabilities assumed by the purchaser. 72 The court next determined
that the net recapture amount, the total amount of excessive de
preciation recaptured minus the tax liability attributed to that
amount, qualined as interim earnings and pronts within the mean
ing of the treasury regulations and therefore qualifIed for an up
ward rennement of basis. 73 In other words, the net recapture, or
earnings and pronts, was realized subsequent to the purchase and
prior to the liquidating distribution. The historical background of
section 334(b)(2) illustrates that interim earnings and pronts consti
tute one of the rennements designed to maintain parity between a
direct purchase and stock purchase and thus reflects the realities of
the transaction. 74
To achieve this result the court relied heavily upon its previ

71. Id.
72. Id. at 320-22. Petitioner Smith argued that the fair market value of the as
sets was equal to the purchase price of the stock. The court, however, held that the
proper amount must reflect the total consideration paid. Since the petitioner was
aware of the potential tax liabilities, taxes and other miscellaneous liabilities as
sumed by the purchaser also had to be added into the fair market value of the assets.
Id.
This procedure prevents the purchasing corporation from lowering its price
based on the recapture tax liability and subsequently predicating its liability on the
lower purchase price. In Smith, however, the petitioner had a different motive. The
valuation of the intangible assets received by petitioner was calculated by the resid
ual valuation method. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 97, 105, 112-13 (1977). This method entails
subtracting the fair market value of the tangible assets from the total cost of the as
sets to obtain the fair market value of the intangible assets.
By increasing the . . . starting figure [cost], respondent [Government] ob
tains a greater value for intangibles and thereby reduces the extent to which
refined adjusted basis will be allocated to the tangible (and depreciable) as
sets. In this regard, it is important not to confuse refined adjusted basis with
the cost figure .... The latter figure is essential herein only for the purpose
of placing a value on intangibles under the residual valuation method. Once
intangibles are assigned a fair market value, the refined adjusted basis ... is
allocated among all assets, tangible and intangible, in proportion to their re
spective fair market values.
69 T.C. at 321 nA. A lower starting figure was clearly the petitioner's goal.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955). The court relied on First National
and concluded that the recapture liability was dependent on the liquidation of the
subsidiary and not on the purchase price of the stock. The recaptured amount was
recognized between acquisition and liquidation and therefore qualified for the re
finement treatment. 69 T.C. at 324-25.
74. Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
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ous decision in First National State Bank of New Jersey v. Com
missioner.75 In that case, the subsidiary, upon liquidation, was re
quired to include its bad debt reserve as income. 76 Conceptually,
both recapture and recovery of bad debt reserves are codified ver
sions of the tax benefit rule. 77 The central issue in First National
was whether inclusion of the bad debt reserve as income resulted
in a corresponding increase in earnings and profits and, if so,
whether it would be reflected in the basis of the assets received
from the subsidiary upon liquidation. 78 The parties had stipulated
earlier that the tax liability attributable to the recovered amount
was a proper upward refinement to the basis of the stock. 79
The First National court concluded that the amount of the bad
debt reserve included as income, minus the corresponding tax lia
bility, caused an increase in earnings and profits. The court thus
arrived at the issue of whether the earnings and profits had accu
mulated during the interim period between acquisition and liquida
tion as prescribed by the regulations. 8o If so, the taxpayer would
be entitled to an upward refinement to the stock's purchase price.
Initially, the court accepted the treasury regulations as a reason
able interpretation of section 334(b)(2).81 These regulations purport
to remove the effects of a delayed liquidation by utilizing refine
ments to compute the purchaser's basis in the newly acquired as
sets. The basis then reflects the true value of the acquired stock.
Just as the adjusted basis for assets acquired in a direct pur
chase theoretically reflects their value or cost on the date pur
chased, so should the basis for assets acquired by stock purchase
reflect their value on the date received in the liquidating distribu
tion. The stock purchase price, however, reflects only the target's
75. 51 T.C. 419 (1968).
76. Id. at 422-23. Since the bad debt reserve was no longer needed, it was con
sidered "recovered" within the meaning of the tax benefit rule. This rationale, which
was undisputed by the taxpayer, was held invalid in a subsequent case, Nash v.
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970). In Nash, the Supreme Court held that for the pur
pose of applying the tax benefit rule, "end of need" was not synonymous with "re
covery." Id. at 3-4. But see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.65, at
11-84.
77. Sections Ill, 1245, and 1250 all incorporate the basic principles of the tax
benefit rule. That is, the sections all involve a previously taken deduction which was
later recovered in the course of a taxable event. See generally text accompanying
note 69 supra.
78. 51 T.C. at 425.
79. Id.
80. The regulation is discussed in note 73 supra.
81. 51 T.C. at 427.

212

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:199

financial condition on the sale date. If the liquidation is not imme
diate, the refinements provided in the regulations allow the pur
chaser, essentially, to adjust the value of the stock to reflect the in
terim business transactions and thus accurately depict the target's
financial condition on the liquidation date.
The Tax Court in First National applied the regulation's re
finements and determined that the earnings and profits indeed had
been accumulated during the interim period commencing "on the
date of purchase and ending upon the date of the last distribution
in liquidation. "82 As a result, the regulations required an upward
refinement to the stock's purchase price equal to the full amount of
the bad debt reserve. 83
As indicated by at least one private letter ruling,84 the Inter
nal Revenue Service (IRS) did not adhere to First National when
issuing technical advice. In that ruling the IRS implicitly conceded
that the income recovery from recapture resulted in an increase in
earnings and profits. Although fully aware of the similarities be
tween recapture and recovery of bad debt reserve,85 the IRS main
tained that the realized earnings and profits were not the kind of
interim earnings and profits contemplated by the regulations. 86 In
Smith, the IRS anticipated that the Tax Court would hold, as it did,
that the rationale of First National controlled. The IRS, therefore,
alternatively argued that the "substituted basis" provision,87 also
contained in the regulations, prevented the upward refinement or
step-up in basis.
The use of this provision of the treasury regulations is most
prevalent in sales of assets during the postacquisition and preliqui
dation interim. It provides a mechanism for the accurate computa
tion of the gain or loss on a particular asset that is attributable

82. Treas. Reg. § 1.334(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955).
83. Assume that a bad debt reserve of $10,000 was recovered into income. At a
50% tax rate this would consist of a tax liability of $5,000 and earnings and profits of
$5,000. The refinements pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(1), (2) (1955)
would increase the assets' basis by $10,000.
84. Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, issued Dec. 15, 1977, reprinted in
Horvitz, 268 T.M. Depreciation Recapture-Corporate Transactioll B-21 (1978). The
Commissioner of the IRS conceded that his position was contrary to the rationale of
First Natiollal. Id. at B-24. Private letter rulings may not be used or cited as prece
dent.
85. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
86. Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, reprillted ill Horvitz, supra note 84, at
B-24.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(vi)(a) (1955).
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solely to the interim period. Under the regulation the adjusted ba
sis of the stock allocable to the asset sold is substituted for that as
set's true basis. Thus, assume the target owned a particular asset
with an adjusted basis of $75,000 and a fair market value of
$100,000 as of the date the stock was purchased. The purchase
price of the stock allocable to this asset is $100,000. If this item is
sold for $110,000 prior to the date of the liquidating distribution,
the gain, for purposes of computing the interim earnings and pro
fits, is calculated in the following manner. A new basis, determined
by reference to the purchase price of the stock, here $100,000, is
substituted for the true basis of $75,000. Therefore, the gain on the
sale is $10,000, not $35,000. Upon liquidation the adjusted basis of
the target's stock is increased by $10,000 to $110,000. 88
As the IRS argued in Smith, this rule would prevent an up
ward refinement for the portion of earnings and profits attributable
to the amount of recapture. To simplifY what actually occurred in
Smith, assume that the target possessed an asset with a fair market
value of $200,000 and an adjusted basis of $100,000 which was sub
ject to $100,000 recapture. Assuming a fifty percent tax rate on or
dinary income, the IRS would allow the $50,000 refinement for the
assumed tax liability attributable to the recapture, but it would
deny the refinement for the $50,000 of earnings and profits by ap
plying the substituted basis rule and calculating the interim earn
ings and profits using a basis figure of $200,000. According to this
method the amount of interim earnings and profits would equal
zero, the $200,000 sale price minus the asset's $200,000 adjusted
basis.
The Smith court rejected this contention as a misconstruction
of the regulation's underlying purpose: to neutralize the effects of
a delay in liquidation on the purchaser's basis in the acquired as
sets. The court reasoned that since the amount of recapture was
caused by the liquidation and was not a function of its timing, the
rationale for invoking the substituted basis provision did not ex
ist. 89 As a result of the court's rejection of the substituted basis
rule and its application of section 1.334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) of the regula
tions, the purchaser received an additional upward refinement to

88. [d.
89. 69 T.e. at 327. See B. BI'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11,45, at
11-40 to 11-42 for examples of this adjustment. See also Silverman, supra note 68, at
560.
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its basis in the acquired assets. 90 This rationale, applicable here in
a recapture context, also would apply in the tax benefit situation.
In Tennessee-Carolina 91 the amount recovered by Service Lines
would have been the same had Service Lines liquidated immedi
ately instead of two months subsequent to the acquisition.
This refinement for the interim earnings and profits is the root
of the potential disparity between a direct purchase of assets and a
stock purchase. 92 Assume, for example, that Purchaser (P) has one
asset with a fair market value of $200,000 subject to $100,000 re
capture. In a direct asset purchase, P will pay Seller (S) $200,000
and will receive a $200,000 cost basis in the asset. S then will pay
the recapture tax liability. If P purchases the stock from S's share
holders, the purchase price will be reduced by the amount of the
potential recapture tax liability, $50,000, to arrive at a purchase
price of $150,000;93 and P will assume the tax liability of $50,000.
Additionally, the $100,000 recapture generates $50,000 of earnings
and profits. 94 On these facts, the basis of the asset would be
$250,000, calculated by adding to the $150,000 stock purchase
price $50,000 in assumed tax liability and $50,000 in earnings and
profits. The result is that P, having "spent" $200,000, receives a
basis of $250,000, $50,000 higher than the basis it would have re
ceived in a direct asset purchase. 95 This result clearly appears to
be contrary to the underlying policy of section 334(b) (2), which at
tempts to achieve parity for basis purposes, and quite possibly is a
misinterpretation of the regulations.
Assuming that the Smith court's treatment of assets subject to
recapture will be applied to ·assets subject to the tax benefit rule,
the following section describes the overall effect of these decisions
on our central parity concepts.

90. See Treas. Reg. § L334-1(c)(4)(v)(a)(2) (1955).
9L 65 T.e. at 440. See text accompanying notes 47-67 supra.
92. Although some authorities may agree that the step-up for earnings and pro
fits is allowable under a strict interpretation of the regulations, they also agree that
parity is distorted because a higher basis is achieved through a stock purchase. See
Bonovitz, supra note 66, at 93-102; McCaffrey, Tax Aspects of Liquidating a Subsidi
ary Recently Acquired by Purchase, 56 TAXES 858, 866-67 (1978); Miller, Section
334(b)(2) and the Smith Case, 56 TAXES 691, 692-93 (1978); O'Hare, 16-4th T.M. Liq
uidation of Subsidiaries-Basis-§ 334(b)(2), at A-19 to A-22 (1978); SilVerman, su
pra note 68, at 558-64.
93. See text accompanying note 71 supra; Bonovitz, supra note 66, at 90-92;
McCaffrey, supra note 92, at 860.
94. See text accompanying notes 72 & 73 supra.
95. Id. See also Treas. Reg. § L334-1(c)(4) (1955).
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ANALYSIS

To recall briefly the analytic parameters of this discussion,
there is currently a split between the Sixth and Ninth Circuits on
the application of the tax benefit rule to section 336 distributions.
Tennessee-Carolina, without statutory authority96 and influenced
by overriding parity considerations, apparently has redefined the
recovery requirement of the tax benefit rule. 97 The Ninth Circuit
previously had declined to take a similar route and instead referred
the task 'to Congress. 98 The eventual elimination of this split, ab
sent congressional intervention, must await further decisions.
Smith meanwhile has undertaken a close examination of sec
tion 334(b)(2). This analysis seeks to compare the tax treatment of a
direct asset with a stock purchase acquisition when one applies
Smith's interpretation of the section 334(b)(2) refinements to a real
ization of tax benefit income.
The upward refinement for earnings and profits derived from
r€1capture and similar provisions has been the subject of much criti
cal commentary.99 In fact, a comparison of Smith and First Na
tional indicates that the judiciary itself is unsettled in its approach
to the problem. These two decisions treated the amount of earn
ings and profits allowed in the upward refinement in significantly
different fashions. In First National the court allowed the entire
amount of net earnings and profits into the stepped-up basis, 100
whereas in Smith the upward refinement was computed on a pro
rata basis 101 based on an average monthly earnings and profits
amount for the portion of the fiscal year that had elapsed before
liquidation. This method of computation was not at issue in Smith
because neither party disputed its accuracy.l02 The computation
was predicated on the following information. On the date of liqui
dation, nine months had elapsed in the subsidiary's fiscal year, and
two months had elapsed from the time of acquisition until liquida
tion. An average monthly earnings and profits figure was derived
for the nine-month period and multiplied by two, the number of
96. I.R.C. § 1245 recapture does not encompass a recovery of costs expensed
pursuant to § 162. Similarly, the § 111 tax benefit rule is inapplicable. See also
O'Hare, supra note 66, at 201-04.
97. Id. at 200.
98. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
99. See note 92 supra.
100. 51 T.C. at 427-28; see text accompanying notes 82 & 83 supra.
101. 69 T.C. at 323-34.
102. Id. at 328.
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months in the interim period. loa This figure comprised the upward
refinement for earnings and profits.
This manner of calculation would effect a result drastically dif
ferent from that reached in First National. If a corporation were
liquidated immediately upon acquisition, as in First National, the
pro rata calculation applied in Smith would deny a step-up for
earnings and profits. The purchasing corporation reaps the full ben
efit of the earnings and profits refinement only if it delays liquida
tion for a full year. This calculation appears to achieve a result sim
ilar to the one achieved through the use of the substitute basis
rule. 104 Recall that since the substitute basis rule purports to re
move the effects of a delayed liquidation, a corporation liquidated
immediately receives no refinement. Under the Smith pro rata ap
proach, an immediate liquidation would- result in zero refinements.
This result is confusing since the Tax Court in both Smith and First
National held that the recovered amounts constituted earnings and
profits based on the distribution of assets in liquidation subsequent
to acquisition. 105 Since the income was attributable to the liquida
tion of the subsidiary, it was incorrect for the Smith court to calcu
late the interim earnings and profits on a pro rata basis. 106
Whether the earnings and profits refinement should be pro
rata or complete, the earlier mentioned criticism remains: pur
chasing stock, in lieu of acquiring assets directly, affords the
purchasing corporation a greater stepped-up basis. 107 Although par
ity of basis treatment, as originally conceived by Kimbell-Diamond
Milling Co. v. Commissioner,108 cannot be effectuated through the
mechanism of section 334(b)(2) and its regulations, an application of
this section's principles to the concept of parity, as sought by sec
tions 336 and 337, may demonstrate their validity. Recall that par
ity for the purposes of this article is defined as equality in tax treat
ment, not necessarily in tax result.
103. [d. at 324.
104. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
105. 69 T.C. at 325 (citing First Nat'l State Bank v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. at
427-28).
106. "Under no circumstances could the depreciation recapture be considered
earned over the entire nine-month period. It was clearly attributable to the time of
liquidation and either all should have been considered or none of it." McCaffrey, su
pra note 92, at 867.
107. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text.
108. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aJfd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1951).
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Two commentators have suggested that the additional step-up
for earnings and profits, beyond the consideration actually paid,
renders application of the tax benefit rule to section 336 meaning
less for basis purposes. 10 9 This perspective can be outlined as fol
lows. Assume Parent (P) decides to purchase all the stock of Sub
sidiary (5) and subsequently to liquidate 5 to obtain its assets. The
sole assets of S are previously expensed tires and tubes with a fair
market value of $100,000. P pays the shareholders of S $100,000
for their stock. Upon liquidation, S must recognize $100,000 of in
come. This amount produces a tax liability of $50,000 and earnings
and profits of $50,000. 110 P's basis in the assets will be $200,000,
consisting of the $100,000 stock price, $50,000 tax liability, plus
$50,000 earnings and profits. P then may expense the tires and
tubes at $200,000, thereby offsetting the income of $100,000 recog
nized by S and reported on the consolidated return and providing
an additional $100,000 deduction. Also, the original shareholders of
S receive a windfall on their stock. If P had purchased the assets
directly, however, they would have received only $50,000. 111 Par
ity is potentially destroyed on all fronts.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, this transaction yields the incor
rect result. When a corporation expects to encounter recapture lia
bility after the liquidation, the purchase price is adjusted down
ward. 112 This reflects p's assumption that S will face recapture tax
liability. This more realistic scenario, outlined in the following hy
pothetical, will cause a much different result than that explained
above. P reduces the purchase price to $50,000 and assumes the
$50,000 tax liability upon liquidation. p's basis in the tires and
tubes will be $150,000, computed as follows: $50,000 for the stock;
$50,000 for the tax liability; and $50,000 for the earnings and pro

109. Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate
Liquidations, 54 TAXES 902, 917-18 (1976); O'Hare, supra note 66, at 202-3.
110. This calculation, as with all the calculations in this article, presupposes an
effective tax rate of 50% on ordinary income.
111. If P purchased the assets directly from S, it would have to pay income tax
on this recovered amount. This leaves $50,000 available for distribution to the share
holders. A direct sale of their stock for $100,000 naturally yields more after capital
gains-tax dollars.
112. See R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. at 322. See also Bonovitz,
supra note 66, at 90-92; McCaffrey, supra note 92, at 860. This decision by the pur
chaser allows him to obtain the asset with a lower initial expenditure. The stockhold
ers of the acquired corporation will receive the same for their stock as in a direct as
set acquisition.
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fits. 113 This result, at the very least, eliminates the windfall to S's
former shareholders.
Now consider the result of the above hypothetical in the con
text of a direct asset purchase. P pays S $100,000 taxable at fifty
percent with the remaining $50,000 being distributed to S's share
holders in a liquidating distribution. F's basis in the newly acquired
assets, which it subsequently will deduct as an expense item, is
$100,000. In the last two examples, the original shareholders of S
received $50,000, a result illustrating that parity exists between the
two alternatives. In the second example, P may expense its
$100,000 basis in the tires and tubes. This is the exact amount
which it originally paid. In the first example, the stock purchase, P
has a stepped-up basis of $150,000. When S includes the tax bene
fit income of $100,000 on the consolidated return, it washes or
equals P's "refinements" and leaves a potential deduction of
$50,000 which is exactly the amount it originally paid. Although
the dollar amounts in the two examples are different, the tax treat
ment is identical. In either case the purchaser eventually obtains a
deduction equal to his original expense. If the refinements in the
stock purchase acquisition do not include a full step-up for earnings
and profits, P would be penalized for purchasing stock instead of
assets. 114 Any potential deduction would be negated due to the in
clusion of the tax benefit income. The result presented assumes
that the pro rata earnings and profits step-up applied to the recap
ture in Smith is erroneous 115 and would not be used. If the IRS
challenges this transaction and follows Smith instead of First Na
tional, the result described above will fluctuate according to the
timing of the transaction.
These various adjustments and tax benefit recoveries establish
a "rough parity" between the two methods of asset acquisition. The
term "rough parity" is appropriate because, although the tax treat
ment accorded the parties to asset acquisitions is equal, the result

113. Recall that the amount recovered or recaptured into income generates
earnings and profits as well as a tax liability. Here, the amount recovered, $100,000,
if taxed at 50% would produce $50,000 of earnings and profits and a $50,000 tax bill.
114. It is precisely on this point that Messrs. Morrison and O'Hare feel the tax
benefit rule is meaningless in a § 336 context. Morrison, supra note 109, at 902;
O'Hare, supra note 66, at 200. If, however, there is no step-up, the deduction washes
and the purchaser is penalized for buying the stock. Secondly, the step-up cuts ofT
any windfall to the stockholders of S. Without the tax benefit rule they receive an
obvious windfall. See note 111 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
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from a revenue collection perspective is unequal. A reexamination
of the two examples illustrates why. Assume the facts are identical
except that P has $500,000 of income unrelated to the acquisition.
Column I of the table set forth below illustrates the result pursuant
to a stock purchase, while Column II reflects the result pursuant to
a direct purchase. In Column I, assuming that P may deduct its to
tal stepped-up basis, the total tax collected is $225,000. In Column
II the total revenue collected is $250,000, $50,000 from Sand
$200,000 from P.
COLUMN I
Stock Purchase
Sections 334(b)(2) and 336
Transaction

Amount
(in thousands)

COLUMN II
Direct Purchase
Section 337
Transaction

Amount
(in thousands)

1. Purchase price
of stock

$50

1. Purchase price
of assets

$100

2. P corp.'s other
income

$500

2. S corp.'s tax
benefit income

$100

3. S corp.'s tax
benefit income

$100

4. P corp.'s gross
income

$600

4. P corp.'s gross
income

$500

5. Deduction for
expensed assets

($150)

5. Deduction for
expensed assets

{$100)

6. Adjusted gross
income

$450

6. Adjusted gross
income

$400

7. Tax paid by P
(50% rate)

8. Total tax
revenue to
government

$225

$225

3. Tax paid by
S corp.
(50% rate)

7. Tax paid by P
(50% rate)

8. Total tax
revenue to
government

$50

$200

$250

Before one may argue that the variance between the tax paid
by S and P in Column II demonstrates inequitable tax treatment,
several policies must be considered. First, there are advantages
and disadvantages to either route of asset acquisition. None of
these considerations amounts to the use of "mere formalisms,
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which exist solely to alter tax liabilities. . . . "116 Indeed, in the di
rect acquisition of Column II, the tax paid by P is less than that
paid in Column 1,117 yet the bottom line represents greater tax
revenue for the federal coffers.
The purchasing corporation's choice may hinge on many fac
tors, including the basis allocation pursuant to section 334(b)(2) and
the accompanying regulations. us Regulation section 1. 334-1(c)
(4)(viii) provides that the adjusted refined basis ordinarily shall be
allocated to the assets received in proportion to their net fair mar
ket values.1l9 The net fair market value is defined in the regula
tions as an asset's "fair market value less any specific mortgage or
pledge to which it is subject. "120 This applies to both tangible and
intangible property whether or not it is depreciable or amortizable.
It does not apply to cash or its equivalent. Once an asset's basis
has been determined, the basis is increased by the amount of any
specific lien, mortgage, or pledge against the asset.
The Commissioner's current position with regard to these ad
ditions to basis is quite significant. Theoretically, recapture or tax
benefIt liability may be attributed directly to certain assets 121 and,
for basis purposes, may be treated as a specific lien. The govern
ment originally adhered to this theory122 but no longer does. The
Commissioner currently treats recapture liability as an unsecured
liability.123 Presumably, tax benefit income will be treated in a
similar fashion. This normally has the effect of diluting the purchas
er's current deductions because a portion of the refInements will
be allocated to the basis of the nondepreciable assets. This princi
116. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334.
117. Note that S pays a tax of $50,000 on the $100,000 received in the direct
purchase.
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955).
119. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955) provides in part:
Except as provided in the preceding sentence, the amount of the adjusted
basis of the stock adjusted as provided in this paragraph shall be aliocated as
basis among the various assets received (except cash and its equivalent) both
tangible and intangible (whether or not depreciable or amortizable). Ordi
narily, such allocation shall be made in proportion to the net fair market
values of such assets on the date received (the net fair market value of an as
set being its fair market value less any specific mortgage or pledge to which
it is subject). To that portion of the basis thus determined, for each property
against which there is a lien, should be added the amount of such lien.
120. [d.
121. See O'Hare, supra note 66, at 203.
122. See Morrison, supra note 109, at 921.
123. See Private Letter Ruling No. 7750009, reprinted in Horvitz, supra note
84, at B-24.
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pIe can be explained in terms of the previous hypothetical, where
the stock purchase price was reduced to $50,000. 124 It is
foreseeable that P's final basis, including refinements, of $150,000,
will be allocated as follows: $100,000 to the tires and tubes, repre
senting their appraised value; and $50,000 to the remaining assets
in proportion to their fair market values. If the $.50,000 is allocated
to goodwill, a nondepreciable asset, P loses the deduction. There
fore p's current deduction for the tires and tubes will be a wash
against the recovered income, and the remaining $50,000 of refine
ments is allocated among the other assets, including goodwill. P re
ceives no immediate, favorable tax result; its current dollars have
secured only future deductions, not current ones, as in a section
337 direct acquisition.
The main advantage to the buyer is that he may obtain the as
sets with less money through a stock purchase. That is, the pur
chaser spends less after-tax dollars. Of course the buyer also must
be advised of the nontax reasons for refusing to buy the stock. 125
Section 337 transactions are generally less complex. Here the
buyer and seller can assign the cost basis to a particular asset, thus
securing the buyer's immediate deduction of expense items. 126 The
buyer, however, as illustrated in Columns I and II must provide
more after-tax dollars to purchase the assets.
In deciding which method of acquisition is preferable, the
buyer must examine several factors prior to the transaction. Parity
is evident in the tax treatment of direct asset purchases and stock
purchases, but the buyer must evaluate the advantages and disad
vantages in light of his own circumstance. If parity originally was
meant to eliminate this kind of decisionmaking, rather than simply
to divorce tax treatment from the form of a transaction, then parity
may be an impossible goal. If so, the more logical recourse may be
to refuse to apply recapture or tax benefit rules to either section
336 or 337. Legislative fiat may be the answer. Congress, however,
has not been active in this area, and the IRS has allowed the regu
lations to section 334(b)(2) to lie dormant since 1954.127
124. See text accompanying notes 112 & 113 supra.
125. The most common reason is the fear of undisclosed or contingent liabili
ties. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 10, ~ 11.63, at 11.67 n.155.
126. Assuming an arms-length agreement, this would be based on a § 1012 cost
basis.
127. Much of the confusion in this area has developed since the enactment of
the statutory recapture provisions in 1962. Since these recapture sections override §§
336 and 337, the regulations to § 334(b)(2) should have been amended or clarified.
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CONCLUSION

Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
different forms of transferring assets from one corporation to an
other often produced different tax consequences despite the simi
larity of economic result. The buyer's choice of a particular form
controlled his eventual basis in the acquired assets, while the sel
ler's choice influenced the amount of proceeds distributable to its
shareholders. The 1954 Code sought, through sections 337 and
334(b)(2), to assure the parties equal tax treatment, whether the as
sets were purchased directly from the corporation or indirectly
through a purchase of all the seller's outstanding stock. The intro
duction of statutory recapture provisions and the application of tax
benefit concepts operated to upset this parity. Not only was the tax
benefit rule applied only to the direct asset form of acquisition, to
the seller's detriment, but additionally a conflict between govern
ment policy and judicial interpretation of statutory recapture and
tax benefit recoveries rendered the buyer's basis subject to specu
lation.
Both Tennessee-Carolina and Smith admirably continued the
crusade toward a return to parity of tax treatment. Tennessee
Carolina's application of the tax benefit rule to a stock purchase
form of acquisition and Smith's analysis of the basis rules pursuant
to section 334(b)(2) have illustrated a limited or rough parity of tax
treatment, albeit not in the amount of tax paid.
Unfortunately, courts are limited to the issues as pre
sented and cannot deal with such concepts as parity in a broad,
sweeping fashion. As a result, certain basic problems are left
unresolved, leaving tax planners with indefinite guidelines. While
parity, if only by chance and not by design, may yet be restored, it
is apparent that the Eighty-third Congress, upon enacting the
"Anti-Court Holding Co." statute, section 337, and codifying the
Kimbell-Diamond principle, section 334(b)(2), envisioned a much
smoother mechanism to handle this problem.

